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Introduction
The issue of welfare reform is made difficult because of the boundaries we traditionally (yet 
implicitly) place between the tax system and the benefit system. To most economists, benefits 
are transfers, and transfers are equivalent to negative taxes. The key insight here is to turn this 
proposition on its head, to suggest that tax concessions are really benefits and should therefore 
be accounted for as such. Somewhat disconcertingly for many people, this means that almost all 
of us receive some income that can best be understood as benefits. 
Benefits in New Zealand are not only paid by WINZ, and arguably the most important benefit-
paying agency is the IRD (Inland Revenue Department). "If it walks like a duck, and quacks like
a duck, then it probably is a duck". Benefits paid by the IRD include:
a. "Tax Breaks" 
b. Working for Families family of "tax credits" 
c. Independent Earner Tax Credit 
d. Concessions on a person's first $70,000 of annual income 
e. Subsidised company tax 
By the very nature of graduated income tax scales, whereby the first dollars earned are taxed at 
concessionary rates, then all taxpayers receive some tax concessions. Therefore it can 
accurately be claimed that all taxpayers are beneficiaries. Given that almost all adult non-
taxpayers are also beneficiaries ± receiving benefits in such forms as Family Tax Credits, New 
Zealand Superannuation, and Accommodation Supplements as well as traditional benefits such 
as the Invalids Benefit ± then it is not unreasonable to claim that "we are all beneficiaries now". 
From this "we are all 
beneficiaries now" perspective, 
the issue becomes one of equity. 
Horizontal Equity is a rights-
based perspective, whereas 
negative equity is a needs-based
perspective. Both principles 
apply to a sound benefit system. 
Benefits paid (or justified) under 
horizontal equity principles 
cannot be classed as transfers. 
Rather, they are dividends. One 
shareholder in a business firm 
receives the same income share 
as another shareholder on the 
basis of the principle of treating 
equals equally. 
6RPH%DVLF3ULQFLSOHV
± Private and Public Income Rights 
 People are born free, into societies.
 People have both private and public ownership rights, and obligations;
ie people have both private and public equity.
 People have a right to income from both public and private sources.
± Equity Principles
 Horizontal Equity ± treating equals equally ± means all persons within a 
society have identical public rights and obligations.
± note, though: minors may have their rights defined differently
 Vertical Equity ± treating unequals unequally ± means that persons 
without special needs have some obligation to concede a portion of their 
public income rights in favour of those who in practice are not able to draw 
on sufficient private incomes to meet their special circumstances.
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Public-Private Shares of New Zealand's National Income
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Children (minors) have the same rights as adults, but those rights need not be expressed in the 
same ways as for adults. Thus an equal income entitlement that would be paid to adults in 
monetary form might be paid to children as additional social expenditure on their behalf, 
including expenditure on their education.
Benefits paid or justified under vertical equity principles are transfers, and are conditional, by 
their very nature, on the needs of the recipients. Needs may include the inability to secure a 
private income due to circumstances such as unemployment, disability or the requirement to 
care for others. Or it may include a shared belief that older persons should be exempt from the 
requirement to gain a private income through work. Or a recognition that child-raising and 
housing requirements create additional needs.  
The approach taken here is that taxation is based, in principle, on horizontal equity, with the 
individual rather than the household as the basic taxable entity. Benefits (dividends or transfers) 
may be payable on grounds of either horizontal or vertical equity. All instances of vertical equity 
± treating unequals unequally ± shall be accountable on the benefit side of the ledger. Thus, for 
example, a tax concession negotiated with a movie production company would be accountable 
as a subsidy (a form of transfer benefit) rather than as a reduced tax liability.  
The only kind of income tax that conforms with horizontal equity is a proportional or "flat" tax. 
The benchmark underlying flat rate of tax in New Zealand, since 1988, is 33 cents per dollar (33 
per cent) of national income: from 1988-2000 the top personal rate, trust rate and company 
rate were 33 per cent. The 39 per cent rate introduced in 2000 was a surcharge then applied 
only to the highest 5 per cent of individual incomes; however, trust and personal rates realign at 
33 per cent from 1 Oct 2010.1  
The accounting reform suggested here would mean that 
all individuals pay exactly 33 per cent of their income as 
income tax, with the difference accounted for as a 
benefit. Such a benefit, which is lower for lower income 
recipients, as it stands, cannot be justified on vertical 
equity grounds. Nevertheless, despite being horizontally 
inequitable, it is much closer to being a dividend than a 
transfer. 
A flat taxation rate of 33 per cent represents a 33 per 
cent share of gross domestic product that is claimed as 
public income,2 leaving the remaining 67 per cent share as private income. 
In the example below, we consider adults earning $0, $500, $1000, $1500 or $2000 per week 
before tax. The right hand column shows their present after-tax income, assuming no receipt of 
any kind of benefit other than statutory income tax concessions. The privately-sourced income 
column applies the horizontal equity principle (67% of gross earnings), meaning that the 
difference between privately-sourced income and current disposable after-tax income ("net 
income") is income sourced from the 33 per cent public claim on GDP.  
We see that for higher income earners the annual public-sourced income comes to exactly 
$9080, and that for persons on an income close to average ($1000 per week) their public 
income component comes close to that $9080 figure.  
                                                          
1 The average tax rate approaches 33%, asymptotically. 
2
There are additionally subsequent public revenue claims arising from indirect taxes (eg Goods and Services Tax) and 
profits from publicly-owned businesses. These other sources of public revenue already incorporate horizontal equity 
principles.
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Reform Informed by Equity Principles
*Most adults currently receive total annual benefits of 
$9,080 or more.
*Account for the first $9,080 of WINZ benefits as a true 
Public Equity Benefit (horizontal equity).
*Account for the remainder as a transfer payment from 
public funds (vertical equity).
*For those whose total benefits are less than $9,080:
- account for the shortfall as a tax surcharge
- eliminate tax surcharges as public finances permit
- assess transfer payments on basis of household need
3HUVRQDO3ULYDWH	 3XEOLF,QFRPH
 3ULYDWH,QFRPH RI*URVV(DUQLQJV
± assuming a 33% underlying tax rate
 $GGLWLRQDOLQFRPHUHFHLYHG GXHWRWD[
FRQFHVVLRQVWD[FUHGLWV:,1=EHQHILWV
LVGUDZQIURPWKHSXEOLFVKDUHRIWKHFDNH
"Non-Beneficiary" Examples using October 2010 tax scales:
$pw $ annual $ annual % $ annual % $ annual %
0 0 0 0 0
500 26,000 5,530 21.3% 17,420 67.0% 22,950 88.3%
1,000 52,000 8,540 16.4% 34,840 67.0% 43,380 83.4%
1,500 78,000 9,080 11.6% 52,260 67.0% 61,340 78.6%
2,000 104,000 9,080 10.9% 69,680 67.0% 78,760 77.9%
Public-Sourced 
Income
Private-Sourced 
Income
Net IncomeGross Income
We clearly see that present public-sourced income comes close to conforming to the 
requirements of a horizontal equity (dividend) benefit. We shall call this implicit individual 
benefit ±currently $9080 per annum ± a "public equity benefit" (PEB). 
Currently, most persons earning less than the 
average fulltime wage (just under $1000 per week), 
qualify for some kind of vertical equity benefit, as do 
many earning more than that (eg abated Family Tax 
Credits, Accommodation Supplements on their 
mortgages).
So a substantial majority of New Zealand adults do 
presently receive at least $9080 of publicly sourced 
income. The policy challenge is: (i) to account for 
the first $9080 of all individuals' publicly sourced 
income as a Public Equity Benefit (payable as of 
right), and to only account for excess 
publicly-sourced income as needs-based transfer 
payments; and (ii) to ensure that all adults receive at least $90803 of publicly-sourced income.
It is useful to account for any shortfalls in 
publicly-sourced income (eg, in the present 
context, situations where an adult New 
Zealander receives less than $9080 of 
publicly sourced income) as a tax 
surcharge. This means that we can 
presently account for the $9080 as an 
explicit Public Equity Benefit, and we can 
clearly see the policy challenge as one of 
eliminating "low income tax surcharges".
                                                          
3 A lesser figure could be adopted, but that would be interpreted as a tax increase by middle-high income earners. A 
more politic solution would be to focus any future 'tax cuts' on making the existing $9080 benefit into a truly universal 
dividend-style benefit. 
Public Equity Benefit (PEB)
 $OOHDUQHUVUHFHLYHLQFRPHIURPWKHSXEOLF
VKDUHRI1DWLRQDO,QFRPH
± WKLVEHQHILWORRNVPRUHOLNHDdividend WKDQDtransfer
 hence it can be understood as a public equity benefit (PEB)
± ORZHDUQHUVSUHVHQWO\JHWDVPDOOHU3(%
 present PEB conforms neither with horizontal nor vertical equity
 company dividends never discriminate against the low paid
 :HFRPSHQVDWHPRVWQRQHDUQHUVDQGORZ
HDUQHUVIRUWKHLUUHGXFHG3(%VE\SD\LQJ
WKHPVXEVWDQWLDOWUDQVIHUEHQHILWV
HJ :,1=%HQHILWV8%'3%HWF)DPLO\7D[&UHGLWV
$FFRPPRGDWLRQ6XSSOHPHQWV
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How would this new accounting approach affect low income families? 
First, it would allow such families 
to treat a greater share of their 
households' publicly-sourced 
incomes as rights-based dividend 
benefits (Public Equity Benefits), 
and a lesser share as transfers 
which maintain the stigma of 
being "hand-outs". 
Second the focus of future tax 
reform would be to ensure that 
Public Equity Benefits 
represented a bottom-line, a 
benefit that can never be lost. For 
example, changes in persons' 
hours of work, household 
composition, or partners' incomes 
will not affect this bottom-line benefit. Given that high income earners already receive this 
benefit unconditionally, the argument is compelling that it should be payable to all adult New 
Zealanders. 
Following this approach, then the process of reforming the WINZ (vertical equity) system of 
transfer payments should be much less fraught, given that, with needs-based benefits being 
seen to form a relatively smaller share of total publicly sourced income, 'beneficiaries' (meaning 
people in receipt of transfer benefits) would be at risk 
of losing less than if their entire benefits are regarded 
as conditional transfers. 
We account for our systems in order to understand 
them as clearly as possible. Good accounting systems 
will therefore open the door to appropriate changes to 
those systems. The principal argument here is that 
improved accounting enables us to make explicit a 
Public Equity Benefit (PEB) that is already there 
implicitly. Once PEBs are visible, we need to investigate 
and ideally remove any inequitable or inefficient 
anomalies that cohabit that benefit. Low income 
surtaxes are clearly inequitable. They are also 
inefficient. Families and individuals have incentives to 
modify their circumstances so as to avoid them.4
To maintain the integrity of all benefits they must be indexed over time, at least to the CPI 
(consumers' price index) as WINZ benefits are indexed today. Ideally, in growing economies, 
equity benefits at least should be indexed to some other indicator ± for example nominal GNI 
(gross national income) per capita ± to ensure that publicly sourced income grows at least as 
quickly as privately sourced income. 
There are strong arguments that the principal drivers of productivity growth are collective inputs 
± such as social capital, education, infrastructure, good public policies. If these arguments are 
                                                          
4 We see such avoidance today, as 'work avoidance' brought about by high 'effective marginal tax rates' as people 
become less eligible for transfer benefits. 
/RZ,QFRPH7D[6XUFKDUJH
$pw $ annual $ annual % $ annual % $ annual %
0 0 0 0 0
500 26,000 5,530 21.3% 17,420 67.0% 22,950 88.3%
1,000 52,000 8,540 16.4% 34,840 67.0% 43,380 83.4%
1,500 78,000 9,080 11.6% 52,260 67.0% 61,340 78.6%
2,000 104,000 9,080 10.9% 69,680 67.0% 78,760 77.9%
Public-Sourced 
Income
Private-Sourced 
Income
Net IncomeGross Income
IRUSHUVRQRQSZannual tax surcharge
 3(%± DFWXDOWD[FRQFHVVLRQUHFHLYHG
 $540
IRUSHUVRQRQSZannual tax surcharge
 3(%± DFWXDOWD[FRQFHVVLRQUHFHLYHG
 $3,550
applied to person receiving no transfer benefits; eg caregiver not eligible for Family Tax Credits
Low Income Families
 ERWKSDUHQWVVKRXOGUHFHLYH
3XEOLF(TXLW\%HQHILWV
 &KLOG6XSSRUWLIDSSOLFDEOHLVDSULYDWHWUDQVIHU
 DGGLWLRQDOVXSSRUWZKHUHDSSOLHGIRUDQG
PHDQVWHVWHGSD\DEOHDVYHUWLFDOHTXLW\WUDQVIHUV
± WUDQVIHUVIURPSXEOLFIXQGVPD\EHFRQGLWLRQDORQPHHWLQJ
VRPHDSSURSULDWHSXEOLFREOLJDWLRQVQRWQHFHVVDULO\SDLGZRUN
Single Parent families
 SDUHQWPRUHOLNHO\WKDQIRUSDUHQWIDPLOLHVWR
UHTXLUHVRPHVXSSRUWIURPSXEOLFWUDQVIHUV
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valid, then it follows that, over time, the public claim over GDP should rise, progressively, above 
the 33 per cent share depicted here. This would indicate a need for gradual increases in the 
underlying flat tax rate, and increases in public equity benefits over and above those prescribed 
by any indexing system. 
Conclusion 
This reformed system of accounting for 
benefits leaves us with a tax-benefit system 
with two core horizontal equity parameters: 
an underlying flat rate of income tax (eg 33 
per cent), and a public equity benefit (eg 
$9080 per annum). These parameters are of 
course set through the political process. One 
can imagine a right-wing government 
proposing a lower core tax rate, a reduced 
public equity benefit, and greater reliance on 
needs-based transfers. A left-wing 
government may be more inclined to raise 
the core tax rate, enabling increased spending on collective goods (such as health-care and 
education) and increased transfer payments. A centre government, while maintaining a strong 
commitment to collective goods' provision, might emphasise more the desirability of raising the 
level of the public equity benefit as a kind of growth dividend that benefits all equally. 
